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Abstract
Women have become better represented in business, academia, and government over time, yet
a dearth of women at the highest levels of leadership remains. Sociologists have attributed the
leaky progression of women through professional hierarchies to various cultural and psychological
factors, such as self-segregation and bias. Here, we present a minimal mathematical model that
reveals the relative role that bias and homophily (self-seeking) may play in the ascension of women
through professional hierarchies. Unlike previous models, our novel model predicts that gender
parity is not inevitable, and deliberate intervention may be required to achieve gender balance in
several fields. To validate the model, we analyze a new database of gender fractionation over time
for 16 professional hierarchies. We quantify the degree of homophily and bias in each professional
hierarchy, and we propose specific interventions to achieve gender parity more quickly.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A professional hierarchy is a field in which an employee enters at a designated low level
and gradually moves up the ranks. For instance, large businesses have interns through
CEOs, hospitals have residents through head physicians, and academic institutions have
undergraduates through full professors. Over time, women have generally become better
represented in many industries (e.g., [1–4]), but women are still poorly represented at the
highest levels of most professional hierarchies (e.g., [5–7]). This has been called the ‘leaky
pipeline’ effect.
Countless factors have been proposed to explain this so-called ‘leaky pipeline’ effect: fam-
ily responsibilities [8], different professional interests between the genders [9–11], biological
differences [12], unconscious bias in the workplace [13, 14], laws restricting gender discrimi-
nation [15, 16], societal gender roles [17–19], and other entrenched cultural or psychological
factors. Many of these qualitative theories require an implicit assumption that men and
women make fundamentally different decisions, either as a result of biological differences or
social indoctrination.
Some quantitative models have attempted to study the ascension of women through
certain fields without relying on intrinsic differences between the sexes. Shaw and Stanton
[20] calculate the ‘inertia’ of women through several academic hierarchies, and find that
gender differences play a diminishing role in promotion over time. Holman et al. [21] present
the first quantitative model to our knowledge that attempts to predict the time required to
reach gender parity in academic STEM fields, with estimates as high as several centuries in
some disciplines. Their model assumes logistic growth to gender parity of the proportion
of women in senior and junior academic roles (as estimated by last and first authorship
on research papers, respectively). Although logistic growth and eventual gender parity is
a reasonable assumption for their phenomenological model, we create a mechanistic model
to examine the relative impact of two major sociological factors, homophilic (self-seeking)
instincts and gender bias, on the progression of women through professional hierarchies. We
find that gender parity is not guaranteed, and gender fractionation may never settle to an
equilibrium.
II. MODEL
Broadly speaking, two classes of people influence the ascension of individuals through
a professional hierarchy: people at lower levels choose to apply for higher positions, and
people at higher levels choose to promote applicants into the next level. People at higher
levels affect the promotion of individuals through their hiring biases, while the decisions
to apply for promotion made by those at lower levels are affected by their own homophilic
tendencies.
Women in hierarchical professions tend to be promoted more slowly than men, even when
accounting for differing productivity and attrition, indicating that gender is a salient factor
in the hiring process [22–26]. If gender is the determining factor when deciding between
equally qualified candidates, we will say that a gender bias exists. We define gender bias as
all conscious or unconscious decisions made by the employer during the hiring process that
are affected by the gender of the applicant. For simplicity, we will assume that gender-based
hiring bias is constant across all hierarchy levels (i.e., employers will uniformly reduce or
enhance female candidates’ relative chance of promotion at all levels).
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Gendered differences in promotion also depend on gender differences in the applicant
pool due to individuals self-selecting, consciously or unconsciously, whether or not to submit
an application. When gender is a salient factor in deciding whether or not to submit an
application, we will assume that such decisions are based largely on a homophilic instinct. In
other words, when an individual considers whether or not to apply for a promotion, he or she
looks at the demographics of those working at the above level and evaluate whether or not
they ‘belong’ in that higher level. While this assumption may seem simplistic, many studies
show that people unconsciously self-segregate based on gender from a early age [27–30]. In
fact, perceptions of gendered jobs perpetuate much of the occupational gender segregation
we see today [31–35].
With the goal of understanding the relative roles that bias and homophily (self-segregation)
play in the ascension of women through professional hierarchies, we derive a minimal math-
ematical model that incorporates both forces. To introduce the model, we begin with a
simple example.
A. Example
Consider the decision process that occurs during the transition between two levels in a
professional hierarchy (Figure 1). Suppose the lower level is 40% women, and gender is not a
factor in eligibility for promotion; then the group eligible for promotion is also 40% women. If
women are not well-represented in the higher level, then women may not feel as comfortable
applying for promotion as men. To be clear, we do not suppose that women are intrinsically
less likely to apply for promotion; rather we assume that the gender demographics in the
upper level affect both men and women’s feeling of belonging (homophily) in the upper level.
Say men are twice as likely to apply for promotion due to these homophilic instincts.
Then the applicant pool will shrink to 25% women. If no bias towards or against women
exists in hiring, then 25% of those granted promotion will be women. However, if women
are slightly less likely than men to be granted promotion due to bias, then the fraction of
women hired will shrink again. We assume this decision process occurs between all levels in
a professional hierarchy. The schematic in Figure 2 is a visualization of a generic hierarchy.
B. Model derivation
We begin by assuming that the probability P (u, v) of seeking promotion to the next level
is a function of the fraction of people at the upper level who share the applicant’s gender,
u, and the fraction of like-gendered individuals in the applicant’s current level, v. There
exists a ‘one-third hypothesis’ that supports the anecdotal evidence that an individual feels
comfortable in a group environment when at least 30% of the members share the individual’s
demographic status [36, 37]. To our knowledge, this hypothesis has not been rigorously
tested in the real world, so we allow P to take a more flexible form. Specifically, we suppose
that the threshold of comfort may depend on the environment in which a person currently
resides. We also assume that the threshold does not delineate an instantaneous switch from
0% comfort to 100% comfort; instead the comfort level may gradually change around that
threshold. One simple function that captures this behavior is the sigmoid
P (u, v) =
1
1 + e−λ(u−v)
, (1)
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group eligible 
for promotion
(40% women)
group applying for 
promotion (25% women)
probability that man applies for promotion: 50%
probability that woman applies for promotion: 25%
group granted a promotion
(20% women)
HOMOPHILY
probability that man is promoted: 67%
probability that woman is promoted: 50%BIAS
FIG. 1. Example of a potential decision process between two levels in a professional hierarchy.
where u is the fraction of like-gendered individuals in the level above, v is the fraction
of like-gendered individuals in the current level, and λ is the strength of the homophilic
tendency. This function need not be a literal probability because only the relative likelihood
of applying for promotion is relevant. Because we choose to not include inherent gender
difference in the model, we assume that this function applies to both men and women. See
Figure 3 for a sketch of this homophily function.
Given this probability P (u, v) of seeking promotion, the fraction of women in the applicant
pool is
f0(u, v) =
vP (u, v)
vP (u, v) + (1− v)P (1− u, 1− v) , (2)
where u is the fraction of women in the higher level and v is the fraction of women in the
current level.
In addition to self-segregation dynamics, hiring bias towards or against women will change
the proportion of female applicants who are promoted. We incorporate this constant bias
b as the female fraction of those promoted if the applicant pool has an equal number of
men and women. For instance, a bias b exceeding 1
2
would imply that women are favored
disproportionately, and a bias less than 1
2
suggests that men are favored. The fraction of
women promoted to the next level is then
f(u, v; b) =
b v P (u, v)
b v P (u, v) + (1− b)(1− v)P (1− u, 1− v) . (3)
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FIG. 2. Schematic of an L-level hierarchy. The jth level in the hierarchy has a certain fraction
women xj , and people retire or leave the field from each level at a rate Rj . The general population
is assumed to be 1/2 women at all times.
This is not the only way to incorporate bias, but it is a simple way to ensure that bias does
not leave vacancies or induce the promotion of those who have not applied. As an example,
a naive choice to incorporate bias would be f(u, v; b) = bf0(u, v), where b < 1 indicates bias
against women. However, this choice permits f > 1 if b or f0 are sufficiently large.
Because professional hierarchies are frequently competitive, with each level smaller than
the level below it, we assume that all vacancies will be filled. The vacancies are created by
individuals who are promoted to the next level, those leaving the field at a particular level,
or those retiring from the top level. The change in the number of women at each level, xjNj,
is
d
dt
(xLNL) =RLNL f (xL, xL−1; b)−RLNL xL
d
dt
(xjNj) =
(
L∑
k=j
RkNk
)
f (xj, xj−1; b)−RjNjxj
−
(
L∑
k=j+1
RkNk
)
f (xj+1, xj; b) for 1 < j < L
d
dt
(x1N1) =
(
L∑
k=1
RkNk
)
f(x1,
1
2
; b)−R1N1x1 −
(
L∑
k=2
RkNk
)
f (x2, x1; b) ,
(4)
where L is the number of levels in the hierarchy, xj is the fraction of people in level j who
are women, Nj is the number of people in the jth level, Rj is the retirement/leave rate at
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FIG. 3. An example of the probability that a woman seeks promotion, dependent on the demo-
graphics of the level to which she is applying. In this example, a woman is more likely to apply for
promotion if there are more women in the level above her. The probability changes most rapidly
around the demographic split she is most accustomed to, the gender split in her current position.
the jth level,
∑L
k=j+1RkNk is the total number of retiring people above the jth level, b is
the bias parameter, and f( · ) is the fraction of people promoted to the next level who are
women. Because it may not be intuitive that the change in the number of women at lower
levels depends on the total number of retiring people above the level, we provide a simple
example to illustrate this feature in the Appendix.
We normalize system (4) by dividing each equation by the number of people retir-
ing/leaving the level (i.e., RjNj):
1
RL
dxL
dt
=
promoted from
lower level︷ ︸︸ ︷
f (xL, xL−1; b)−
retire out
of level︷︸︸︷
xL
1
Rj
dxj
dt
= (1 + rj)f (xj, xj−1; b)− xj − rjf (xj+1, xj; b) for 1 < j < L
1
R1
dx1
dt
= (1 + r1)f(x1,
1
2
; b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
hired from
general pool
− x1︸︷︷︸
leave
field
− r1f (x2, x1; b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
promoted to
next level
,
(5)
where rj is the ratio of the total retiring people above the jth level to the retiring people in
the jth level. Algebraically, this ratio is rj =
∑L
k=j+1 RkNk/RjNj. Note that this system can
be condensed into one line by taking rL = 0 and x0 = 1/2. Refer to Table I for descriptions
of the model variables and parameters.
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Variable Meaning
xj fraction of people in the jth level who are women
L number of levels in hierarchy
Rj retirement/leave rate at the jth level
Nj number of people in the jth level
rj ratio of the total retiring people above the jth
level to the retiring people in the jth level(∑L
k=j+1 RkNk/RjNj
)
P ( · ) likelihood of seeking promotion
f( · ) fraction of people promoted to next level who are women
b bias towards or against women (b = 1/2 is no bias)
λ strength of homophilic tendency
TABLE I. Model variables and parameters for (5).
C. Null model
Consider a null model with no hiring bias or homophily. In model (5), this would imply
bias b = 1
2
and the likelihood of seeking promotion P is constant (λ = 0). The model then
reduces to the linear system
1
Rj
dxj
dt
= (1 + rj)(xj−1 − xj) for 1 ≤ j ≤ L. (6)
The only steady state is {x∗j} = {12}. The Jacobian of the system evaluated at this state
yields all real, negative eigenvalues. Therefore, {xj} = {12} is a stable sink of the null
model. In other words, without bias or homophily, each level in the hierarchy will directly
converge to equal gender representation, as seen in the model by Holman et al. [21]. The
rate of convergence to parity for each level depends on the eigenvalues of the system: λj =
−Rj(1 + rj), for j = 1, . . . , L. The eigenvalues depend only on the level sizes Nj and
leave rates Rj. The convergence time to parity for the whole system is then given by
1/minj{Rj(1 + rj)}, the characteristic timescale of the system.
See the Appendix for a more complete discussion of analysis of the null model. Figure
11 shows convergence to gender parity in a hypothetical academic hierarchy.
D. Homophily-free model
Now consider a model in which people do not use gender to decide whether to apply for
a promotion (i.e., λ = 0), but employers are biased towards or against women (i.e., b 6= 1
2
).
In this case, the model (5) reduces to
1
Rj
dxj
dt
= (1 + rj)
bxj−1
bxj−1 + (1− b)(1− xj−1) − xj − rj
bxj
bxj + (1− b)(1− xj) for 1 ≤ j ≤ L.
(7)
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FIG. 4. Example of direct convergence to 50/50 gender split under the null model (6).
In this example, we consider a hypothetical academic hierarchy with six levels, {Rj} =
{1/4, 1/5, 1/6, 1/7, 1/9, 1/15}, and {Nj} = {13, 8, 5, 3, 2, 1}.
As in the null model (6), the homophily-free model has a single, attracting fixed point. The
presence of bias, however, pushes the steady-state gender fractionation away from gender
parity. This effect is more extreme in higher levels than in lower ones. In particular, if the
bias is against women (b < 1
2
),
x∗L < . . . < x
∗
j < . . . < x
∗
1 <
1
2
.
See the Appendix for details, and see Figure 5 for transient model behavior for a hypothetical
academic hierarchy.
E. Bias-free model
Consider an alternative model in which people self-segregate by gender, but employers
are not biased towards or against women (i.e., b = 1
2
). Then model (5) reduces to
1
Rj
dxj
dt
= (1 + rj)f0 (xj, xj−1)− xj − rjf0 (xj+1, xj) for 1 ≤ j ≤ L. (8)
We observe three qualitatively different model behaviors for (8): for mild homophilic ten-
dencies, the system converges to gender parity; for moderate homophily, the fraction of
women oscillates in all levels; and for strong homophily, the system converges to either
male or female dominance depending on the initial state. The emergence of oscillations in
such a system may not seem intuitively obvious. We explain the onset of oscillations in the
Appendix.
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FIG. 5. Examples of transient behavior of a 6-level homophily-free model (7). (a) For strong bias
against women (b = 0.35), all levels directly converge to male majority, with the strongest majority
in the highest levels of leadership. (b) For weak bias against women (b = 0.49), the fraction of
women in each level directly converges to a value near 50/50, though there are still more men
in each level. (c) For weak bias favoring women (b = 0.51), the fraction of women in each level
directly converges to a value near 50/50, though there are more women in each level. (d) For
strong bias favoring women (b = 0.65), all levels directly converge to female majority, with the
strongest majority in the highest levels of leadership.
Figure 6 shows the range of model behavior for a hypothetical academic hierarchy. See
Figure 7 for an example of a bifurcation diagram for the bias-free system. Although this
diagram is representative of typical model behavior, the location of bifurcation points may
shift as parameters vary.
For the parameter values listed in the caption of Figure 6, we see that as homophily
increases from a small value, a supercritical Hopf bifurcation occurs, which initiates the onset
of stable oscillations in all hierarchy levels. Although these oscillations are not identical, they
have the same period at steady state, as suggested by the transient behavior in Figure 6(b)
and (c). At λ ≈ 3.9, the limit cycle in each hierarchy level undergoes a pitchfork bifurcation
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FIG. 6. Examples of transient behavior of a hypothetical academic 6-level bias-free model (8).
(a) For mild homophily (λ = 2), all levels converge to gender equity after oscillating above and
below a 50/50 split. (b) For stronger homophily (λ = 3), the fraction of women in each level
oscillates about the 50/50 split without converging. (c) For yet stronger homophily (λ = 4.5),
limit cycles appear to behave like those of a relaxation oscillator. (d) For strong homophily
(λ = 5), each level equilibrates to nearly all women (solid lines) or nearly all men (dashed lines),
depending on the initial condition. For all examples, {Rj} = {1/4, 1/5, 1/6, 1/7, 1/9, 1/15}, and
{Nj} = {13, 8, 5, 3, 2, 1}.
of limit cycles, after which no stable equilibria at or steady oscillations about gender parity
occur.
At λ = 4, a degenerate pitchfork bifurcation occurs for all parameter values. At this point,
2L+1 equilibria, several of which are unstable, emanate from the pitchfork as determined by
a center manifold reduction. In Figure 7, we focus on the equilibrium at gender parity and
a pair of equilibria which eventually become stable, through subcritical Hopf bifurcations
at λ ≈ 4.35. All limit cycles eventually end at homoclinic bifurcations: the periodic orbit
spends more and more time near a saddle point (not shown) as the period diverges.
As rj → 0 for each level, the Hopf bifurcations converge at the pitchfork bifurcation. In
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FIG. 7. Numerical bifurcation diagram for homophily parameter λ in a 3-level bias-free system.
Solid lines are stable equilibria/cycles, dashed lines are unstable equilibria/cycles, black dots are
bifurcations of equilibria, and black lines are bifurcations of limit cycles. All limit cycles show the
gender fractionation for the lowest level, x1. Generated using AUTO[38, 39] with N1 = 70, N2 =
2, N3 = 1, R1 = 1/4, R2 = 1/5, R3 = 1/6. Convergence to a degenerate pitchfork bifurcation at
λ = 4 as rj → 0 is shown in the Appendix.
that limit the pitchfork has a greater degeneracy, producing 3L equilbria. Loosely speaking,
hierarchies with small rj have very few people retiring relative to the number of people
who would like to be promoted, making the hierarchies competitive. The limit rj → 0 is
not realistic for any real-world hierarchy to our knowledge, but analysis near this limit aids
numerical continuation; see the Appendix for details.
F. Model with homophily and bias
Finally, we explore the full model (5) with bias b 6= 1
2
and homophily λ 6= 0. The long-term
dynamics are similar to those of the bias-free model (8). For small homophily, regardless of
initial state, the hierarchy tends towards a ‘biased’ fractionation profile. For large homophily,
the gender fraction polarizes, with bistable equilibria at both large and small fractions of
women at each level. Figure 8(a),(d),(e) show examples of transient behavior at these high
and low homophily values.
Figure 8 shows a slight perturbation of the system from the bias-free case, highlighting
the degeneracy of the pitchfork bifurcation in Figure 7; branch colors correspond with the
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colors of related branches in Figure 7. Generically, for moderate levels of homophily, the
limit cycles that emanate from the bifurcation ‘bend’ in the direction of bias (e.g., for b < 1
2
,
toward fewer women in each hierarchy level) as homophily increases through the supercritical
Hopf bifurcation. The degenerate pitchfork bifurcation unfolds into several saddle-node
bifurcations and a continuous fixed point curve. Similarly, the pitchfork bifurcation of limit
cycles unfolds into a saddle-node bifurcation of limit cycles and a continuous limit cycle
curve. As in Figure 7, all limit cycles end in homoclinic bifurcations.
For lower values of bias b, the Hopf bifurcation from the equigender fixed point shifts along
the branch of equilibria it emanates from, corresponding to a decrease in x1 and an increase
in homophily. At the same time, the length of the limit cycle branches emanating from the
Hopf point decreases, and the Hopf point is eliminated in a Takens-Bogdanov bifurcation.
For stronger bias (b ≈ 0.45), long-term behavior manifests solely as equilibria, which includes
the possibility of decaying oscillations. Limit cycles are no longer possible. See the Appendix
for the co-dimension 2 bifurcation diagram, where both bias b and homophily λ are varied.
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FIG. 8. Numerical bifurcation diagram for homophily parameter λ in a 3-level system with slight
bias against women (b = 0.499). Solid lines are stable equilibria/cycles, dashed lines are unstable
equilibria/cycles, black dots are bifurcations of equilibria, and black lines are bifurcations of limit
cycles. All curves show the gender fractionation for the lowest level, x1. Generated using AUTO[38,
39] with N1 = 70, N2 = 2, N3 = 1, R1 = 1/4, R2 = 1/5, R3 = 1/6. Examples of transient behavior
for several positions within the bifurcation diagram are on the margins: (a) λ = 3, (b) λ = 3.5, (c)
λ = 4, (d) λ = 5 with lower initial condition, and (e) λ = 5 with higher initial condition.
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III. MODEL VALIDATION
With this simple model, we aim to extract useful information from real-world hierarchies
without claiming to fully explain their dynamics. For instance, we wish to predict when (or
if) fields will reach gender parity, what sociological or psychological factors may be the main
drivers of gender fractionation dynamics, and what interventions may help various fields
reach gender parity more quickly.
A. Data
We collect time series data on the fraction of women in each level of many professional
hierarchies [40–66]. Although most studies of this nature have focused on academia [20, 21],
the generality of our model allows us to examine a larger variety of hierarchies: medicine,
law, politics, business, education, journalism, entertainment, and fine arts/music. Of the 23
hierarchy datasets we assembled, 16 are sufficiently comprehensive to attempt model fitting.
Each dataset comprises the following components:
• A hierarchy structure (e.g., undergraduate → graduate → postdoctoral → assistant
professor → associate professor → professor, in a typical academic hierarchy). In the
real world, the hierarchical structure is not perfectly rigid, but we take the structure
to be the ‘typical’ route through the ranks. This structure determines the hierarchy
size L and the ordering of levels in our model (5).
• The fraction of each level of the hierarchy that are women over time. We include
datasets with at least a decade’s worth of continuous yearly data for all levels. If there
are missing years, we use linear interpolation to fill the gaps. Some datasets were
available in a table, but others were extracted from graphical representations using
WebPlotDigitizer [67]. This determines the exact xj(t) for a range of discrete times.
• The approximate relative sizes of each level. Although fields may grow (e.g., medicine)
or shrink (e.g., journalism) over time, we find that the relative level sizes generally stay
approximately the same. Where data on the relative level sizes were not available, we
made educated guesses. This information estimates Nj in our model if we normalize
the top level to 1 (NL = 1).
• The approximate yearly ‘leave’ or ‘retirement’ rates for each level. These statistics
are not available for any hierarchies, to our knowledge. We made educated guesses
for these parameters based on the expected amount of time spent in each level. For
instance, the vast majority of undergraduate degrees are completed in approximately
four years, and relatively few graduates continue on to doctoral study. Therefore, our
initial estimate for the undergraduate leave rate is 0.25 (i.e., approximately a quarter
of undergraduates leave college each year without moving up the academic hierarchy).
We take these proxies to exit rates as estimates for Rj in our model.
All compiled data, including datasets not sufficient for model fitting, are available at North-
western’s ARCH repository: https://doi.org/10.21985/N2QF28.
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B. Model fitting
We wish to fit the model to each dataset in order to quantify the degree of bias and
homophily in each field; with this information, we may predict the long-term fraction of
women in each level of the hierarchies without any intervention, and we can suggest targeted
interventions to reach gender parity more quickly. Theoretically, distinguishing between bias
and homophily in the data should be straightforward because the qualitative effects of each
parameter are different. Bias is the only parameter that independently ‘separates’ levels
(i.e., bias causes the female fractionation xj to differ among levels), while homophily is the
only parameter that independently causes oscillations.
There are many possible ways to fit the model to each dataset. One qualitative way
to measure the degree of bias and homophily in each dataset is to look for separation
between levels and indications of oscillations. Roughy speaking, datasets with strong bias
either towards or against women will have large changes in the proportion of women as one
ascends the hierarchy (e.g., see Figure 5(a),(d)).
On the other hand, datasets with weak bias and moderate homophily will show signs of
oscillations in each level (e.g., see Figure 6(b),(c)), although real datasets may not include
enough time points to resolve a full period of the oscillations. Datasets with weak bias and
strong homophily will appear male- or female-dominated without much separation between
levels (e.g., see Figure 6(d)). If both bias and homophily are strong, then the impact of
each phenomenon will be difficult to deduce visually (see Appendix for phase diagram), and
quantitative methods will be needed.
As a quantitative attempt at fitting, we perform a global minimization of error between
the model and data. We first find a best fit of the model to each dataset by minimizing the
sum of squared error between the model gender fractionation xˆj and the data xj over time
using the Nelder-Mead minimization algorithm [68]. The fitting parameters are b, λ,Rj, Nj
and the initial conditions. We include Rj and Nj as fitting parameters because we do not
have exact values for these parameters, but we heuristically verify that the model fit does
not select values far from our initial guesses. The initial condition is a fitting parameter to
ensure the first data point does not contribute more weight to the fitting process than the
subsequent data points in the time series.
We seed the Nelder-Mead algorithm with 20 initial guesses for the fitting parameters b
and λ, selected uniformly from b ∈ (0.2, 0.8) and λ ∈ (1.5, 6.5). All other parameter guesses
are taken to be our best estimates from available data. After finding the best fit parameters
(b˜, λ˜) from among the 20 seeded searches, we run a second search in the parameter space
near the best fit. In this next step, we seed the Nelder-Mead algorithm with 10 new initial
guesses for b and λ, selected from normal distributions b ∈ N (b˜, 0.05) and λ ∈ N (λ˜, 0.1).
We take, as our final fit, the best fit parameters after this second search. See Appendix for
a visual representation of this algorithm.
We present the best fits from two representative hierarchies in Figure 9. Best fit param-
eters bˆ and λˆ from all datasets are shown in Figure 10. See Appendix for fit parameters and
additional model predictions for all datasets.
To address the concern of possible overfitting, we verify that the ratio of data points to
fitting parameters is large. For each dataset, there are 3L + 1 fitting parameters and LT
data points, where L is the number of levels and T is the number of years in the dataset.
The datasets with the fewest number of levels available and fewest years available should
prompt greatest concern regarding overfitting. Among our datasets, the smallest ratio of
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FIG. 9. Model fit to data from (a) clinical academic medicine[46–48] and (b) academic
psychology[41, 42, 45].
parameters to data points was for the journalism hierarchy, which had 51 data points and
10 parameters. The typical ratio of data points to parameters was about 10:1.
Because our parameter search algorithm is not guaranteed to find the absolute minimum
error between the model and data, we verify that our model results are not excessively sen-
sitive to changes in our fitting procedure. To illustrate, we seed our algorithm’s random
number generator with ten different seeds and verify that the variation in predicted average
gender fractionation is small. We select the two most concerning datasets for this compu-
tationally intensive test: (1) journalism, due to its risk for overfitting, and (2) academic
engineering, due to its unpredictable fitting results during early tests (see Appendix).
IV. DISCUSSION
The presented model vastly simplifies the process by which people choose to advance
their careers, yet we may exploit the model to extract useful predictions and suggestions
for interventions to reach gender parity. By fitting the model to data from over a dozen
professional hierarchies, we may predict the time required to reach gender parity if there are
no cultural or policy shifts within the fields. Unlike the model by Holman et al. [21], we
predict that many fields may never reach gender parity without intervention (see Appendix).
For instance, fields that indicate especially strong homophily (e.g., engineering and nursing)
are expected to become male- or female-dominated. Fields with apparently strong bias
against women (e.g., academic chemistry, math, and computer science) are predicted to
never reach sustained gender parity, at least in the highest levels of leadership.
Fields with bias near 1/2 and weak homophily (e.g., medicine and law) are predicted to
eventually reach gender parity as fast as inertia allows, as modeled by Shaw and Stanton [20].
Effective affirmative action programs could artificially speed the process, but resources may
be better spent in fields where gender parity is not inevitable. One benefit of our modeling
approach is that we can extract the relative impact of two major decision-makers in a
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FIG. 10. Bias and homophily best fit parameters for each hierarchy. Colors indicate the predicted
long-term (equilibrium) female fractionation in the highest level of leadership; if the hierarchy is
not predicted to reach equilibrium, then a time average over the limit cycle was taken. *May
not be a strict hierarchy: although producers hire directors, producers do not typically ‘promote’
directors to producer positions. Likewise for politics.
professional hierarchy: those who apply for promotion and those who grant promotion. For
fields with strong bias against women (b < 1/2), the decision-makers that should be targeted
are hiring committees. For instance, hiring committees could be trained in unconscious
bias, or policies could mandate that the number of promotions offered to women match
the applicant pool. For fields with strong homophily, the decision-makers that should be
targeted are women eligible for promotion. Knowing that fewer women than are eligible are
applying for promotion in male-dominated fields, hiring committees could actively recruit
women to apply for promotion or make the underrepresented gender more visible within the
field.
A. Limitations
Of course, the predictions and interventions suggested by this simple model are subject
to limitations. We assume that hierarchical structures remain constant over time, but this
is not always the case. For instance, some fields that now require a college degree were once
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accessible to those with a high school education. We also assume that individuals must pass
through each level linearly, but many academic fields may or may not include a postdoc,
and political or business leaders may come from outside their field entirely.
To avoid overfitting, we assume that bias and homophily are constant both across time
and across the hierarchy structure. Naturally, the cultures and policies that shape these
sociological properties are not constant; perhaps bias against women has diminished over
time, but maybe bias is stronger at higher levels of leadership. Also, gender may be more
salient to a young person deciding on a major than on an associate professor up for promo-
tion. Therefore, we think of the fitting parameters bˆ and λˆ as an average bias and homophily
over time and the hierarchy structure.
Finally, we have ignored the different decisions that men and women may make. Our
model assumes that men and women on hiring committees are equally biased against a
certain gender, that gender is equally salient to men and women, and that men and women
are equally qualified for advancement. A more sophisticated model may break the symmetry
between men and women.
B. Future steps
Allowing bias and homophily to change over time and across the hierarchy structure
is a natural model extension. In addition to making the model more realistic, it would
also permit interventions to be incorporated directly into the model. If the effect of an
intervention is to change bias and/or homophily, then the model could serve as the basis of
a control problem to find an optimal time-dependent intervention.
Due to the generality of the model, it could also be extended to study the progression
of underrepresented minorities through professional hierarchies. A few complications are
introduced in this case: our model assumes that the gender distribution of the general
population is constant in both space and time, but for racial minorities this is not true.
Also, data collection may prove to be more complicated due to the evolving and sometimes
overlapping definitions of various racial and ethnic groups.
Finally, the model could be generalized to include a spectrum of gender identities, income
levels, or socioeconomic privilege. Two major challenges are introduced with this model
extension. First, the current system of L ordinary differential equations may become a
system of L partial integro-differential equations, which will make model analysis more
difficult. Second, data required to validate such a model will be more challenging to obtain.
V. CONCLUSION
We have developed a simple model of the progression of people through professional
hierarchies, like academia, medicine, and business. The model assumes that gender is a
salient factor in both the decision to apply for promotion and the decision to grant promotion,
but that men and women do not make fundamentally different decisions. Unlike previous
models of the phenomenon, our model predicts that gender parity is not inevitable in many
fields. Without intervention, a few fields may even become male- or female-dominated in
the long term.
By fitting our model to available data, we extract the relative impact of the major
decision-makers in the progression of women through 16 professional hierarchies. In some
17
fields, like academic chemistry, bias of promotion and hiring committees may be the domi-
nant reason that women are poorly represented. In other fields, like engineering, women not
applying for promotion may be the dominant reason for the so-called leaky pipeline. With
this information, we may suggest effective interventions to reach gender parity.
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IX. APPENDIX
A. Model Development
To further illustrate the model, we derive the null model (no bias and no homophily)
with a small number of levels. Consider a four level hierarchy (Figure 11). The top level
has x4 fraction women, has N4 total people, and therefore has N4x4 women and N4(1− x4)
men. People in the top level retire at a rate R4, so R4N4x4 women and R4N4(1− x4) men
leave the top level per time unit.
stay in level stay in levelretire retire
stay in level stay in levelleave leave
stay in level stay in levelleave leave
stay in level stay in levelleave leave
promoted promoted
promoted promoted
promoted promoted
R4N4x4
R3N3x3
R2N2x2
R1N1x1 R1N1(1  x1)
R2N2(1  x2)
R3N3(1  x3)
R4N4(1  x4)
N4(1  x4)N4x4
R4N4x3 R4N4(1  x3)
(R4N4 +R3N3)(1  x2)(R4N4 +R3N3)x2
(R4N4 +R3N3 +R2N2)x1 (R4N4 +R3N3 +R2N2)(1  x1)
FIG. 11. Illustration of a four-level hierarchy without bias and homophily. Each horizontal bar is
a level with Nj people in it, Njxj of whom are women. Pink bars represent the number of women
in the level, and blue bars represent the number of men in the level. Dotted bars represent the
number of people who are exiting the level, either via promotion or by leaving the hierarchy.
The R4N4 people that retire from the top level must be replaced by people from the
third level. Without any bias or homophily, the number of women promoted into the top
level is proportional to the number of women in the third level. Therefore, R4N4x3 of those
promoted are women and R4N4(1 − x3) are men. In addition to the R4N4 people who are
promoted out of the third level, another R3N3 people leave the hierarchy from the third
level without being promoted. Of those who leave the third level, R3N3x3 are women, and
R3N3(1− x3) are men.
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A total of R4N4+R3N3 vacancies are created in the third level by those who are promoted
and those who leave the hierarchy. These positions are filled by those in the second level.
Without any bias or homophily, the number of women promoted into the third level is
proportional to the number of women in the second level. Therefore, (R4N4 + R3N3)x2 of
those promoted are women. In addition to those promoted, another R2N2 people, R2N2x2
of whom are women, leave the hierarchy from the second level without being promoted.
Thus, a total of R4N4 +R3N3 +R2N2 vacancies are created in the second level by those
who are promoted and those who leave the hierarchy. Without any bias or homophily,
(R4N4 + R3N3 + R2N2)x1 of those positions are filled by women. This illustrates that
demographic changes in lower levels depend on the total number of people leaving the
hierarchy in higher levels.
Adding up the total change in the number of women in each level leads to the model (4)
with L = 4 and f(xj, xj−1; b) = xj−1.
B. Model Behavior
Figures 12 and 13 display examples of stable model predictions for a wide range of pa-
rameter values. Figure 12 shows the time required for the top level of the hierarchy to get
within 5% of gender parity, a metric used in the analysis by Holman et al. [21]. Figure 13
shows the fraction of time the top level spends in a 5% band about gender parity.
C. Model Analysis
For efficient analysis, we define
Q(u− v) ≡ P (1− u, 1− v)
P (u, v)
= e−λ(u−v),
Q0(v) ≡ 1− v
v
,
B ≡ Q0(b) = 1− b
b
,
where P is the probability that a person applies for promotion. Note that Q (0) = Q0
(
1
2
)
= 1
and that Q and Q0 are monotonically decreasing. We can rewrite f as
f(xj, xj−1;B) =
1
1 +BQ0(xj−1)Q(xj − xj−1) ≡ fj.
For the analyses in the following sections, it is useful to note that
∂fj
∂xj
= λfj (1− fj),
that
∂fj
∂xj−1
=
(
1
xj−1(1−xj−1) − λ
)
fj (1− fj), and that the evolution equations for xj, j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , L} can be written as
dxj
dt
= Rj [(1 + rj)fj − xj − rjfj+1] , (9)
with x0 =
1
2
and rL = 0.
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FIG. 12. Time that the top level of a 3-level hierarchy takes to reach within 5% of parity (i.e., when
x3 ≥ 0.45) for a range of bias and homophily values. The bias parameter b and homophily parameter
λ are varied, while the parameters N1 = 70, N2 = 2, N3 = 1, R1 = 1/4, R2 = 1/5, R3 = 1/6, and
initial condition (x1(0), x2(0), x3(0)) = (0, 0, 0) are held constant across all simulations. The white
region corresponds to values of b and λ where the top level never comes within 5% of parity.
1. Stability of the Fixed Point in the Null and Homophily-Free Models
In the special cases of the homophily-free (λ = 0) and null (λ = 0, b = 1/2) models, each
level’s dynamics depends only on the fraction of women in that level and the level below.
The Jacobian is therefore lower triangular, and the eigenvalues appear along the diagonal,
λj = −Rj ∂
∂xj
(xj + rjf(·, xj;B))|xj=x∗j
= −Rj
(
1 + rj
f ∗j+1
(
1− f ∗j+1
)
x∗j
(
1− x∗j
) ) ,
where the placement of · reflects the fact that f does not depend on the first argument in
this case, and f ∗j+1 denotes the value of fj+1 for xj = x
∗
j . Since these values are all strictly
negative, the single fixed point that appears in the absence of homophily is attracting.
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FIG. 13. Fraction of time that the top level of a 3-level system spends within 5% of parity after the
transient period (i.e., the fraction of time that 0.45 ≤ x3 ≤ 0.55) for a range of bias and homophily
values. The bias parameter b and homophily parameter λ are varied, while the parameters N1 = 70,
N2 = 2, N3 = 1, R1 = 1/4, R2 = 1/5, R3 = 1/6, and initial condition (x1(0), x2(0), x3(0)) = (0, 0, 0)
are held constant across all simulations. The dark blue region corresponds to values of b and λ
where the top level reaches a steady state outside gender parity. The dark red region corresponds
to parameter values where the top level reaches a steady state within a band of gender parity. All
other colors indicate regions where the fraction of women in the top level oscillates.
2. Ordering of Steady-state Values in the Homophily-Free Model
In the homophily-free case with bias (λ = 0, b 6= 1/2), the steady-state values x∗j satisfy
1 + rj
1 +BQ0(x∗j−1)
= x∗j +
rj
1 +BQ0(x∗j)
=
1
1 +Q0(x∗j)
+
rj
1 +BQ0(x∗j)
,
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since u = 1
1+Q0(u)
. Then if b > 1
2
(bias favoring women), B < 1, and
1 + rj
1 +BQ0(x∗j−1)
<
1
1 +BQ0(x∗j)
+
rj
1 +BQ0(x∗j)
=
1 + rj
1 +BQ0(x∗j)
,
which means that x∗j−1 < x
∗
j for all j. Since x
∗
0 =
1
2
, this implies
1
2
< x∗1 < . . . < x
∗
j < . . . < x
∗
L.
Similarly, b < 1
2
(bias against women) implies
x∗L < . . . < x
∗
j < . . . < x
∗
1 <
1
2
.
3. Degeneracy in the Bias-free Model
a. Fullest Degeneracy for rj = 0 The bias-free model (b = 1/2) has a symmetry
related to our assumption of men and women behaving equally. Within a given hierarchy,
the fractionation of men and women can be swapped, but the dynamics remain the same.
This symmetry gives rise to the degenerate pitchfork bifurcations seen in Figure 7. The
pitchfork bifurcation of fixed points becomes even more degenerate when rj → 0.
For rj = 0, the fixed points necessarily satisfy x
∗
j = f
∗
j . Note that for any value of x
∗
j−1,
f ∗j is a shifted sigmoid with a maximum slope of
λ
4
, and
x∗j = f
∗
j =
1
1 + exp
[
−λ
(
x∗j −
(
x∗j−1 +
logQ0(x∗j−1)
λ
))] .
For a given x∗j−1 ∈ (0, 1), there are at most three solutions of x∗j = f ∗j for λ > 4, and there is
exactly one solution for λ ≤ 4. Since L copies of this equation are satisfied simultaneously,
there are at most 3L fixed points for λ > 4 and exactly one for λ ≤ 4. Given x∗0 = 12 , the
equi-gender state, x∗j =
1
2
∀j, is a fixed point for all λ. Iso-gender states, x∗j = x∗iso for all
j > 0, account for two more for λ > 4. The equations for j > 1 are trivially satisfied, and
the fixed points are given implicitly by the j = 1 equation,
x∗iso =
1
1 + e−λ(x
∗
iso− 12)
=⇒ λ =
log
1−x∗iso
x∗iso
1
2
− x∗iso
≡ λiso (x∗iso) ,
where λiso has even symmetry about x
∗
iso =
1
2
such that there are two solutions, x∗iso,+ >
1
2
and x∗iso,− <
1
2
. Finally, it can be shown that for λ = λiso
(
x∗iso,+
)
= λiso
(
x∗iso,−
)
, there are
additional fixed points where for each j > 0, x∗j ∈ {x∗iso,−, 12 , x∗iso,+}. Since lim
x∗iso→ 12
λiso (x
∗
iso) =
4, all of these 3L fixed points bifurcate from the equi-gender fixed point at λ = 4. The
pitchfork bifurcation is indeed highly degenerate in this case.
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b. Stablity of the Equi- and Iso-gender Fixed Points The equi-gender and iso-gender
fixed points as defined above persist for rj ≥ 0, since for these states fj = xj = fj+1 for
all j > 0. This further implies that xj = fj = x
∗ for all j > 0, where x∗ = 1
2
for λ ≤ 4
or x∗ ∈ {x∗iso,−, 12 , x∗iso,+} for λ = λiso
(
x∗iso,+
)
= λiso
(
x∗iso,−
)
> 4. The tridiagonal Jacobian
matrix M simplifies in this case. In row j, the lower, main, and upper diagonal entries are
mj,j−1 = Rj(1 + rj) (1− µ),
mj,j = Rj [(1 + rj)µ− 1− rj (1− µ)] = Rj [(µ− 1)− rj (1− 2µ)],
mj,j+1 = −Rjrjµ,
where µ = λx∗(1− x∗).
As an aside, we note a useful property of some tridiagonal matrices that can be used to
bound their eigenvalues. Suppose that each pair of upper and lower diagonal entries in a
tridiagonal matrix T have opposite sign, i.e. ti,jtj,i < 0 if i 6= j. Then one can choose a
diagonal matrix D such that the upper diagonal entries of DTD−1 are the exact opposite of
the lower diagonal entries. A similarity transformation by a diagonal matrix preserves the
diagonal entries, and so the symmetric part of DTD−1 is a diagonal matrix whose entries
are the diagonal elements ti,i of T . Further, the eigenvalues of the symmetric part of a
matrix bound the real parts of that matrix’s eigenvalues. Consequently, the real parts of the
eigenvalues of such a matrix T are bounded by the minimum and maximum diagonal entry.
For the Jacobian matrix M , we can use this bound if 0 < µ < 1. In that case, the fixed
point is stable if (µ− 1)− rj(1− 2µ) < 0 for all j. Assuming µ ∈
(
0, 1
2
)
, this requires that
µ−1
1−2µ < minj{rj}, which is always the case since rj ≥ 0. Assuming instead that µ ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
,
the fixed point is stable if 1−µ
2µ−1 > maxj{rj}, i.e. if µ < maxj{rj}+12 maxj{rj}+1 . In the rj → 0 limit, this,
too, is a non-condition: the fixed point is stable for all µ ∈ (0, 1). For maxj rj → ∞, the
condition simply requires µ < 1
2
.
This has implications for the equi- and iso-gender fixed points. For the equi-gender fixed
point, µ = λ
4
, and the fixed point is stable at least from λ = 0 to λ = 2, with the window
of guaranteed stability increasing to λ = 4 as maxj rj → 0. The Gershgorin Circle Theorem
guarantees that, in addition, it is stable for λ < 0 (i.e., when people prefer to be among
the opposite gender). For the iso-gender fixed point, µ = λiso (x
∗
iso)x
∗
iso (1− x∗iso), which lies
in the interval (0, 1) for all x∗iso ∈ (0, 1) \
{
1
2
}
and is 1 for x∗iso =
1
2
. The fixed point is
stable at least for µ < 1
2
or λ greater than approximately 5.46798. This is a transcendental
number that does not depend on any parameter values, and it can be found by solving for
x∗iso numerically with µ =
1
2
and then computing λ(x∗iso). Its window of guaranteed stability
increases with the lower limit approaching λ = λiso
(
1
2
)
= 4 as maxj{rj} → 0.
With these stability bounds in mind, we consider the oscillatory states to which the fixed
points lose stability. We speculate that as rj → 0, i.e. the limit of highly bottom-heavy
hierarchies, oscillatory solutions exist in smaller and smaller ranges of λ around λ = 4. On
the other hand, if a hierarchy has more and more people in upper levels relative to lower
ones, the oscillatory solutions do not necessarily dominate over an ever-expanding interval
in λ; they likely appear at most for λ from about 2 to about 5.5.
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4. Numerical Continuation for the Model with Bias and Homophily
The above analysis of the fully degenerate pitchfork serves as starting point for numerical
continuation of solution branches and bifurcation curves for the most general version of the
model. Since we wish to continue from the degenerate rj = 0 situation, we introduce a new
parameter s, such that s = 0 gives the fully degenerate case and s = 1 gives the desired rj
values:
dxj
dt
= Rj [(1 + srj)fj − xj − srjfj+1] .
Here, we detail our approach for the case when L = 3, with parameter values as in Figure
7. We expect that the procedure generalizes well for different parameters. Starting with
the 33 = 27 fixed points at s = 0 and λ = λiso(0.6) ≈ 4.05, we continue for increasing s.
Only 11 of these fixed points persist to s = 1, those that appear for λ ≈ 4.05 in Figure 7,
with the others being eliminated in saddle-node or pitchfork bifurcations. From the 11 fixed
points, continuation of solution branches proceeds as is typical with AUTO. In particular, in
generating Figure 7, we continue the fixed point branches in λ, noting any Hopf points and
continuing limit cycle branches from there. For Figure 8, we continue the 11 fixed points
first in b down to 0.499 and then in λ as before. In this case, we also independently continue
the upper stable limit cycle in b (green band, Figures 7 and 8), since it is not tied to a fixed
point branch via a Hopf bifurcation for b = 0.499.
We find that for increasing λ, each limit cycle branch terminates in a homoclinic orbit.
Additionally, it appears that as the period diverges there are a series of limit cycle saddle-
node bifurcations occurring in a very small range of λ. While this phenomenon seems similar
to that of a Shilnikov bifurcation, the saddle point associated with the homoclinic orbit is
not a saddle-focus; it has purely real eigenvalues. While interesting dynamically, it occurs
over a very small parameter range, with net result being a large-period termination of the
limit cycle. We do not investigate further here.
Continuation of the bifurcation points in the two parameter λ− b space is more involved
and proceeds in 4 stages:
1. From the 11 bias-free fixed points at λ = 4.5 and the equi-gender fixed point at λ = 3.5,
we continue for b → 0 and b → 1, noting all co-dimension 1 points, here fold points
and Hopf bifurcations.
2. We continue each type of bifurcation in λ and b, making note of all co-dimension 2
points. Here we find Bogdanov-Takens, fold-Hopf, and Bautin points.
3. In the cases of the Bogdanov-Takens and Bautin points, limit-cycle bifurcation curves
emanate from the co-dimension 2 point generically. They are homoclinic curves and
limit cycle fold curves. We approach these via the associated Hopf bifurcations, con-
tinuing the limit cycle in each case along an ad-hoc path in λ and b. We then continue
the limit cycle fold and homoclinic curves. For the homoclinic curves, we use the Hom-
Cont functionality built into AUTO by obtaining an initial approximate homoclinic
solution from a large period limit cycle with a period of at least O(106).
4. Lastly, we capture the unfolding of the pitchfork bifurcation of limit cycles, which
occurs at a cusp point of limit cycle fold curves. By again ad-hoc paths in λ and b,
we approach the fold curves for b 6= 1/2 and then continue.
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The results of this procedure are summarized in a phase diagram (Figure 14). Due to
numerical difficulties, some of the homoclinic curves are cut short. Also, note that at this
scale some of the limit cycle saddle-node and homoclinic curves seem to coincide, reflecting
the Shilnikov-like dynamics. Using this phase diagram, we extend our understanding of
model dynamics from the bias-free case to the case with some bias (Figure 14b). For small
biases, b between approximately 0.48 and 0.52, the qualitative progression of stable states
is similar to that in the bias-free model: single “equi-gender-like” fixed point → oscillations
→ two male- or female-dominated “iso-gender-like” fixed points (cf. Figures 7 and 8). Note
that we do not in general rule out the possibility of other stable states that may appear
yet higher homophily values. Such homophily values, however, are likely to be physically
unrealistic.
We also investigate which of the many states reflected in the phase diagram are physically
relevant. For a historically male-dominated hierarchy, the dynamics evolving from an initial
condition of xj = 0 are perhaps the most relevant. Across bias and homophily, the long-term
states show moderate deviations from gender parity, oscillatory states, and a highly polarized
state (Figure 14c). For the most part, the regions showing qualitatively different behavior
are separated by bifurcation curves. In those cases, the results will not change for sufficiently
small perturbations of the initial condition. In a few instances, though, a qualitative change
in the observed state occurs when the separatrix between two stable states passes over the
initial state, (0, 0, 0).
5. Oscillations and Single-gender-dominated States
The emergence of oscillations and of single-gender-dominated states for low or no bias
may not be intuitively obvious. In brief, those states occur for moderate and high levels
of homophily, respectively, and are due to a balance between homophilic pressures and the
availability of promotable men/women. Here we detail the effect those influences have on
the 2-layer dynamics depicted in Figure 15.
For each low, moderate, and high homophily, Figure 15 shows snapshots in time of x1,
x2, f1 and f2 along with the instantaneous rates of change in x1 and x2. f1 is a one-to-one
function of x1, as accounted for by the gray lines in each snapshot, and x2 (generally xL)
simply follows f2, as indicated by the blue dashed line. The dynamics of x2 and f1 are
therefore secondary to that of x1 and f2, and we can foucs primarily on x1 and f2 and
appeal to the gray and blue lines for a complete dynamical understanding. Recall that the
gender fractionation f2 of the flow of men and women promoted from level 1 to level 2 is
given by f2 = (1 +Q0 (x1)Q (x2 − x1))−1. It depends both on the number of men/women
available in level 1 to be promoted and on the homophily those men/women feel. We find
it useful to consider those two factors separately in two auxiliary forms of f2:
1. considering only the availability of men/women in level 1,
f availability2 =
1
1 +Q0 (x1)
= x1,
i.e. what the flow fractionation would be without homophily. This value is plotted
using small red dots in Figure 15.
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FIG. 14. Phase diagram across bias and homophily. a) Co-dimension 1 curves and co-dimension 2
points. The dashing indicates that the bifurcation involves no stable steady states. b) Zoom
in on phase diagram, showing progression of steady states across homophily that persist for
small bias. Arrows indicate the extents across bias of the stable states seen in Figures 7 and
8. c) Minimum value that x3 takes on in steady state for the male-dominated initial condition,
(x1(0), x2(0), x3(0)) = (0, 0, 0). The relevant bifurcation curves are overlaid and separate qualita-
tively different long-term behavior.
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2. considering only the homophily felt by the men/women in level 1,
fhomophily2 =
1
1 +Q (x2 − x1) ,
i.e. what the flow fractionation would be with identical availability of men and women
but with the actual homophilic pressure. This value is plotted using small yellow dots
in Figure 15.
The actual flow f2 will be influenced by both, but it is often dominated by one. In those
cases, the blue f2 dot is “pulled” strongly towards either the small yellow f
homophily
2 dot or
the small red f availability2 dot. We now describe how the influences of f
homophily
2 and f
availability
2
result in each of the different types of final states: states near gender parity, oscillations,
and single-gender dominated states.
For low homophily (Figure 15a), gender parity is achieved in the long run, and the
dominant contribution to f2 is always f
availability
2 . This means that the gender fractionation
will naturally equilibrate as it does in the null model: x2 tends towards x1, and x1 towards
x0 =
1
2
. A detailed description of each snapshot in Figure 15a follows:
i) x1 is decreasing because more women are being promoted to level 2 than are coming
in from the general population. x2 is tending towards x1, because the promotion flow
into level 2 has roughly the same fractionation as level 1.
ii) x2 reaches a maximum as x1 decreases past it.
iii) x1 continues to decrease and converges to
1
2
. x2 follows.
iv) Gender parity is reached.
For moderate homophily (Figure 15b), oscillations can form because fhomophily2 periodically
becomes the dominant contribution to f2. Here, the homophily is strong enough that a
prevalence of woman at level 2 can sometimes disproportionally incentivize applications and
draw women from level 1 (Figure 15b.iv). But it not sufficiently strong to always replace the
promoted women with women from the general population. This reduces the availabilty of
women that can be promoted later, and the level 2 will eventually see a decrease in women
(Figure 15b.v). This in turn will create a homophilic suppression of female applicants,
resulting in an increase in women at the level 1. Eventually, though, the lower level will
become so female-dominated that there are fewer male applicants available to be promoted
to the level 2. This then causes an increase in the fraction of women at level 2 (Figure 15b.i)
and completes the cycle.
Note that even though the snapshot Figure 15b.iii is qualitatively similar to Figure 15a.ii
for low homophily, x1 and x2 do not converge to gender parity in this case. Instead as
x1 approaches
1
2
(Figure 15b.iv), fhomophily2 dominates over f
availability
2 reflecting the fact that
promotion to level 2 is quite attractive to women in level 1. This causes an exodus of women
from level 1, pushing x1 further down and across
1
2
. A detailed description of each snapshot
in Figure 15b follows:
i) x2 is initially increasing because of the good availability of women to be promoted
from level 1. x1 is also increasing because level 1 is attractive to women in the general
population due to homophily.
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ii) x1 reaches a maximum as the homophily-driven net flow of women into level 1 is
overcome by the availability-driven flow into level 2.
iii) x2 reaches a maximum as x1 and the availability-driven flow f2 decreases past it.
iv) f2 becomes homophily-dominated, pushing x1 down past
1
2
as women are promoted to
level 2.
v) x1 has reached a minimum, and the system is at state roughly symmetric to that in
Figure 15b.ii with men and women swapped. The oscillation will continue with x1
increasing to a maximum and the cycle repeating.
For high homophily (Figure 15c), a female-dominated state emerges as the dynamics pro-
ceed in two phases: first fhomophily2 dominates and then f
availability
2 does. Homophily is so
strong here that, since level 1 initially has female representation a little greater than the
general populaiton, it quickly becomes very dominated by women (Figure 15c.ii). Eventu-
ally, practically no men are available to be promoted from level 1 (Figure 15c.iii), and level 2
subsequently follows in becoming female-dominated (Figure 15c.iv). A detailed description
of each snapshot follows:
i) The strong homophily means the level 1 is very attractive to women in the general
population, but level 2 is unattractive to those already in level 1.
ii) x1 increases very rapidly and x2 decreases.
iii) As x1 approaches 1, the are very few men left to be promoted to level 2. The scarcity
overwhelms the homophily-driven flow of men to level 2, and x2 starts to increase.
iv) Availability remains the dominant force, pulling x2 up towards x1.
v) The female-dominated iso-gender state is reached.
For high homophily (Figure 15c), the dynamics proceed in two phases. First fhomophily2 dominates,
making level 1 very female-dominated and level 2 moderately male-dominated. Then
f availability2 dominates as the availability of men in level 1 dwindles. As a result, the number
of women in level 2 increases to meet the fractionation value in level 1: the iso-gender fixed
point. A detailed description of each snapshot follows:
i) The strong homophily means the level 1 is very attractive to women in the general
population, but level 2 is unattractive to those already in level 1.
ii) x1 increases very rapidly and x2 decreases.
iii) As x1 approaches 1, the are very few men left to be promoted to level 2. The scarcity
overwhelms the homophily-driven flow of men to level 2, and x2 starts to increase.
iv) Availability remains the dominant force, pulling x2 up towards x1.
v) The female-dominated iso-gender state is reached.
D. Fitting Algorithm
See Figure 16 for a pictorial representation of the model fitting algorithm.
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FIG. 15. Qualitative depiction of snapshots in the time evolution for low, moderate and high ho-
mophily and no bias, resulting in the long run in gender parity, oscillations in gender fractionation,
and a state dominated by one gender (the iso-gender fixed point), respectively. For illustration pur-
poses, we choose L = 2, R2 = 0.8, r1 →∞ and R1 → 0 such that R1r1 → 1 (giving x˙1 = f1 − f2),
and an initial condition of (x1, x2) = (0.55, 0.5). We expect that the qualitative behaviors depicted
here reflect those for other parameter choices. The red arrows indicate the direction and magnitude
(not to scale) of motion of x1 and x2, and the text surrounding the topmost plot describes the
meaning of the other graphical components.
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FIG. 16. Illustration of the model fitting algorithm. We seed the fitting algorithm with 20 initial
guesses for the fitting parameters b and λ, selected uniformly (top left). We then run the Nelder-
Mead error minimization algorithm to find a set of local minima, one of which will have the
absolute smallest error (top right). We then seed the fitting algorithm with 10 guess for the fitting
parameters b and λ, selected normally about the previous best fit (bottom left). Finally, we run
the Nelder-Mead error minimization algorithm to find a set of local minima, one of which will have
the smallest absolute error (bottom right). We take this to be our best fit.
E. Model Fitting Results
All plots of data with best fits not displayed in the main paper are shown in Figures
17-23.
All best fit bias b and homophily λ parameters are reproduced in Table II. To compare
with the model by Holman et al. [21], we also compute the predicted number of years from
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2018 until gender parity is reached for both the top and bottom levels. This is not an
exact replication of Holman’s study because we are not using last and first authorship as an
indicator of top and bottom levels, respectively. Like Holman’s model predictions, we see a
wide range of times to parity; unlike their model, our model predicts some fields will never
reach gender parity.
Hierarchy Bias bˆ Homophily λˆ
Years to parity
(lowest level)
Years to parity
(highest level)
Nursing 0.228 7.74 > 200 134
Academic Chemistry 0.415 2.72 -17 30
Academic Math/Stats 0.456 2.12 -24 > 200
Academic Medicine (clinical) 0.474 1.75 -18 > 200
Law 0.485 1.64 -24 > 200
Academic Computer Science 0.489 4.49 > 200 > 200
Engineering Practice 0.496 4.82 > 200 9
Film* 0.497 5.76 -13 > 200
Journalism 0.499 3.47 68 108
Academic Medicine (science) 0.503 2.37 -17 51
Academic Physics 0.506 4.51 > 200 101
Medical Practice 0.523 0.34 -19 26
Academic Biology 0.544 2.66 -24 7
Academic Psychology 0.562 3.58 > 200 13
Politics* 0.604 5.84 68 20
Academic Engineering 0.631 6.26 20 64
TABLE II. Best fit parameters for each hierarchy. Bias b < 0.5 suggests that men may be dispro-
portionately favored for promotion, while b > 0.5 suggests that women may be disproportionately
favored for promotion. Large homophily λ suggests that gender is a salient factor when decided
whether to apply for promotion. Years to parity indicates the predicted number of years beyond
2018 when gender fractionation will first be within 5% of parity. Negative numbers indicate that
gender parity within 5% has already been reached, though may not remain within the gender
parity band indefinitely. Times exceeding 200 years include predictions that gender parity will
never be reached, though we hesitate to make predictions beyond that time frame. *May not be a
strict hierarchy: although producers hire directors, producers do not typically ‘promote’ directors
to producer positions. Likewise for politics.
Because our model does not require gender parity as an eventual outcome, our time-
to-parity predictions are sensitive to small changes in parameter values, especially if the
system is near a bifurcation. For instance, a small decrease in the bias parameter b may
shift time-to-parity from a small number of years to never reaching parity.
However, the average fractionation x in each level is not sensitive to small changes in
parameter values or to the model fitting procedure. See Figures 24 and 25 for two examples
of fitting sensitivity.
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F. Comparison with Other Models
To our knowledge, the model by Holman et al. [21] is the only other quantitative model
capable of predicting time to gender parity. Their phenomenological model is
xj =
1
2 + cj exp (−0.5rjt) for 1 ≤ j ≤ L, (10)
where xj is the fraction of people in the jth level who are women, L is the number of levels,
and cj and rj are fitting parameters. This model exhibits sigmoidal growth towards gender
parity in most reasonable cases. Note that all hierarchy levels are independent of each other
in this model.
We use our fitting algorithm to fit (10) to all datasets and compare the average sum
of squared error between model and data. It is not possible to truly compare the models
with our fitting algorithm because of differing initial parameter search ranges and time to
algorithm convergence. The model by Holman et al. has an advantage that the search
algorithm converges to a best fit quickly, and our model has an advantage of more fitting
parameters.
With those caveats, we find that the average model errors differ by more than the fitting
algorithm tolerance (1e− 4) for seven out the 16 datasets. Among the seven datasets where
our model errors differ, our model has a lower error in six of the seven cases.
The model by Holman et al. better explains the dynamics seen in the dataset Academic
Math/Statistics. Our model better explains the dynamics seen in the datasets Academic
Engineering, Academic Computer Science, Academic Physics, Academic Biology, Academic
Psychology, and Politics.
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FIG. 17. Model fit to data from nursing[42, 49–51, 63–65] (top) and academic chemistry[41–43]
(bottom).
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FIG. 18. Model fit to data from academic math/statistics[40–42] (top) and law[58–60] (bottom).
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FIG. 19. Model fit to data from academic computer science[40–42] (top) and engineering
practice[40, 42] (bottom).
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FIG. 20. Model fit to data from film[53] (top) and journalism[54] (bottom).
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FIG. 21. Model fit to data from academic basic science medicine[46–48] (top) and academic
physics[40–42, 44] (bottom).
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FIG. 22. Model fit to data from medical practice[42, 46, 48] (top) and academic biology[40–42]
(bottom).
43
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
time (years)
fra
ct
io
n 
wo
m
en
 
 
state legislator
US House Rep
US Senator
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
time (years)
fra
ct
io
n 
wo
m
en
 
 
bachelor
doctorate
postdoc
tenure track
full
FIG. 23. Model fit to data from politics[61, 62] (top) and academic engineering[40–42] (bottom).
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FIG. 24. Sensitivity of model predictions to changes in the model fitting algorithm for the jour-
nalism dataset. For ten random number generator seeds (right of points), the differences in error
and predicted average long-term x are small. For reference, the algorithm error tolerance is 1e− 4.
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FIG. 25. Sensitivity of model predictions to changes in the model fitting algorithm for the academic
engineering dataset. For ten random number generator seeds (right of points), the differences in
error and predicted average long-term x are small. For reference, the algorithm error tolerance is
1e− 4.
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